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CROSS-BORDER LITIGATION INVOLVING
CANADIAN AND U.S. LITIGANTS
T. Bradbrooke Smith, Q.C. *
I.

INTRODUCTION

Selected Areas for Examination
Senator Sam Ervin, of Watergate fame, used to tell the story of the
young lawyer who attended a revival meeting and was asked to deliver
a prayer. Unprepared, he gave a prayer straight from his lawyer's heart,
"Stir up much strife amongst the people, Lord, lest thy servant perish."
Much strife can arise in the Canada United States cross-border context, whether between:
a) the two states;
b) the individuals or corporations in those states;
c) the individuals or corporations in one state and the other foreign
state or one of its emanations; or
d) the individuals or corporations in those states and a third state, one
of its emanations or an international organization.
I have been asked to speak about some of the nuts and bolts of crossborder litigation. Certain aspects were covered in depth by Mr. Ristau.
I will try to complement what he said. His experience is very broad
while mine has been selective. Therefore, I leave the main lines to him
and I shall try and highlight a few specific points. I only intend to give a
broad-brush treatment of a few of the matters that arise in trans-border
litigation.
Litigation Between the Governments of Canada and the United States
Litigation between Canada and the United States has not been extensive. Over the last sixty years we have had the I'm Alone, the Trail
Smelter, and the Gut Dam arbitrations, and the GeorgesBank case in the
International Court. These proceedings are in the esoteric domain of
public international law and, hence, are of a rare and wholly unique kind
in which it is unlikely most lawyers will ever be involved.
Closer to home are proceedings under the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement which could have more impact. The FTA represents a discrete but growing subject of specialized cross-border litigation
involving governments as well as private parties. Close attention should
* Stikeman Elliott, Ottawa, Canada. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Torsten
Strom for his assistance in preparing this article.
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be paid to this source of litigation as it evolves. It is not inconceivable
that there will be greater recourse to litigation in state-to-state disputes in
the future, (particularly in relation to general treaty interpretation).
Recourse to litigation in state-to-state disputes as an option to negotiation has been encouraged by both the American and Canadian Bar
Associations. The two Bar Associations endorsed the concept of a regular and defined means of ultimately litigating disputes involving the interpretation of treaties. It continues to be a concern that there is no crossborder equivalent between Canada and the United States regarding
treaty disputes (other than under The Free Trade Agreement). The sanction of litigation, which usually exists in relations between ordinary legal
persons, is lacking.
II.

CROSS-BORDER LITIGATION FROM A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE

The InternationalFramework
In considering cross-border litigation, an arbitrary division can be
made between the framework, or skeletal matters, which essentially constitute form, and those matters which build upon the framework. Crossborder litigation is a very broad field, and this article will touch upon
only a few of the interesting issues in the latter group; that is, certain
matters of a more substantive nature.
Many issues may arise in relation to trans-border litigation, including service out of the jurisdiction, the application of foreign law, and the
rules of comity. Two important framework issues involve international
arrangements for the service of documents and the obtaining of evidence
abroad under the two relevant Hague Conventions. Mr. Ristau elaborated on these framework issues.
Another framework matter is the recognition of foreign judgments.
In Canada there is provincial legislation dealing with the reciprocal enforcement of judgments, and there is also parallel legislation dealing with
the reciprocal enforcement of maintenance orders. These laws extend to
some jurisdictions in the United States.1
There is much jurisprudence on the subject of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Without attempting to encapsulate the
many rules of the conflict of laws, subject to exceptions such as tax or
penal orders, the general rule is that a foreign judgment on a particular
issue will be regarded as conclusive.2
Canadian ConstitutionalConstraints
In Canada the federal executive is responsible for the making of
treaties. The implementation of international agreements, however, folI See e.g., The Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders Act, ONT. STAT. ch. 9 (1982);
The Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 432 (1980).
2 Jean-Gabriel Castel, CANADIAN CONFLICT OF LAWS 15 (2d ed. 1986).
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lows the division of powers between Parliament and the provincial legislatures. In other words, if all or part of a treaty requires legislation to
give it effect, it must be implemented by Parliament or the legislatures, or
both, as the case may be, in accordance with the division of legislative
powers in the Constitution.
The constitutional rationale for this position is that if the Parliament
of Canada could implement any international agreement it entered into,
the door would be open to a significant accretion of federal power not
contemplated by the division of legislative authority in the Constitution
Act of 1867. This was established by the Labour Conventions Case, Attorney Gen. of Canada v. Attorney Gen. of Ontario,3
What this means for cross-border litigations is exemplified in two
concrete and pertinent examples.
The first example involves the Hague Service Convention. The Government of Canada acceded to it upon satisfying itself that provincial law
and rules of court were consistent, or would be brought into line, with
the obligations that Canada would undertake under the Convention.
With the exception of the Federal Court, the relevant legislation and
rules are all within the provincial field of competence as matters of property and civil rights in the province. The accession was recent because of
the time required to ensure consistency of all laws and rules of court with
the Convention.
The second example involves the Hague Evidence Convention. This
Convention also has deals with matters essentially within provincial competence, again relating to property and civil rights. Although the Canada Evidence Act may serve as a vehicle for its introduction into
domestic law to some limited degree, particularly in relation to criminal
matters which are exclusively federal, efforts have been made for some
time to procure the modification of all provincial laws to bring them into
conformity with the Convention. Until this is accomplished, Canada
cannot accede to this Convention. Partial implementation is not possible
in the absence of the modern form of the federal state clause now used in
most international private law conventions. There are, however, ways
around this impediment to the application of international norms. For
example, in relation to trans-boundary pollution, the ABA/CBA Joint
Working Group on Dispute Settlement proposed that a regime of equal
access be established permitting a person in one jurisdiction who has suffered pollution damage to sue in the jurisdiction where the pollution
originated on the same basis as if that person were injured and were a
resident in the latter jurisdiction. By this approach, one is able to circumvent the rule applied in many jurisdictions, which recognizes status
to sue only where the damage is suffered, not where it originates.
This approach involves property and civil rights in the province, a
matter of exclusive provincial jurisdiction and requires a consequent
3

[1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.).
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change in provincial law. Uniform legislation on this subject was procured and enacted in several jurisdictions in Canada; for example: the
Ontario Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act, 1986, ONT.
REV. STAT. ch. 20 (1986). A number of other provinces and states have
passed the same uniform law. This example also illustrates that in Canada, for certain issues, one can effect the extension of certain international rules by reciprocal legislation, without the constraint of having all
jurisdictions enact legislation.
A similar piecemeal approach has been adopted through the use of a
new federal state clause in recent private law conventions, particularly
those of the Hague Conference and UNCITRAL. This clause, also useful in the United States, permits federal states to accede to a convention
with respect to one or more of its component jurisdictions and to extend
the application of the convention to other component jurisdictions as
their laws are brought into conformity with the obligations that flow
from it.
ExtraterritorialApplication of Law
Although not within the scope of this topic, it is important to note
the influence of what is to some the extraterritorial application of foreign
law and to others the exercise of domestic long arm jurisdiction. As will
be evident, the description will vary according to whether one is using, or
sought to be made subject to, the particular domestic jurisdiction.
While most issues of long arm jurisdiction will be brought before the
courts of the state whose jurisdiction is invoked, there may be circumstances where Canadian courts are seized of peripheral issues. One such
example is the Gulf case which will be discussed later. Other peripheral
issues could arise out of attempts to control the commerce of Canadian
subsidiaries of United States enterprises in relation to prohibited exports.
The provisions of the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C.
ch. F-29 (1985), may be relevant where export control legislation is
sought to be applied. The most recent example relates to the successor to
the 1990 "Mack Amendment," a proposal before Congress which, if enacted, would have the effect of making it illegal for a U.S. subsidiary
located outside the United States to trade with Cuba. The Canadian
Government has already indicated it would block Canadian firms from
complying with such a measure.
The Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act may also apply in proceedings where long arm jurisdiction is asserted and where judicial assistance may be sought in relation to domestic proceedings. The Act will
provide an underpinning for Canadian courts to refuse judicial assistance
in cases where national sovereignty is seen to be threatened.
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III.

EVIDENTIARY IssuEs IN CROSS BORDER LITIGATION

Taking of Evidence in Canada
The basic position in Canada is that there are no prohibitive rules
regarding the taking of evidence in civil or criminal proceedings. Where,
however, compulsion of the witness is necessary, the intervention of a
Canadian court is required. This intervention is provided either in accordance with a treaty or statute. As Canada is not yet a party to the
Hague Evidence Convention and, as there is no Canada-United States or
Empire 4(i.e. pre-1931) treaty which applies, one is sent directly to the
Statutes.
When dealing with a situation involving the taking of evidence in
Canada for foreign proceedings, the first place one should refer to in the
statutes is Part II of the Canada Evidence Act. The Act states that in the
absence of Rules of Court dealing with the evidence to be produced in
support of an application, the basic means of obtaining the evidence are
letters of request or letters rogatory,5 a traditional procedure which, of
course, is specifically provided for in the Hague Evidence Convention.
In addition to the Canada Evidence Act, there will probably be applicable and parallel provincial legislation on the subject, such as that
found in the Ontario Evidence Act. As there is generally no basic contradiction between them, both are frequently relied on, although the
Canada Evidence Act alone is resorted to for criminal matters. In addition, where a commissioner has not been identified in the foreign request,
the Canada Evidence Act, which does not require such an appointment
by the party making the request, may be used as authority for the hearing
6
by a commissioner appointed by the Canadian court.
Both the Canada Evidence Act and the companion provincial evidence acts give discretion to the Court to grant letters rogatory where:
a) there is a civil, commercial or criminal matter pending before a foreign court or tribunal; and
b) it appears that the judge of the foreign court or tribunal is desirous
of obtaining the testimony of the witness in Canada.
The Canada Evidence Act contemplates a request to a Canadian
court from a foreign court to order the examination of a witness. The
subsequent order of the Canadian court may be enforced in the usual
way. This is the classic letters rogatory situation requiring the intervention of the courts of the receiving state. The Ontario Evidence Act also
contemplates a court intervention, and applies where a mere commission
7
to take evidence has been issued by the foreign court. Under the
4
5
6
7

JEAN-GABRIEL CASTEL, supra note 2 at 122.

§ 51(2) Evidence Act.
Re ParamountFilm DistributingCorporation v. Ram, [1954] O.W.N. 753.
Pan American World Airways v. Tas InternationalTravel, 37 O.R.2d 59 (1982).
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method followed in the Hague Evidence Convention, letters rogatory
may also be directed to other competent judicial authorities.
The discretion under the evidence acts is generally exercised after
considering such things as whether the evidence is for trial or discovery,
whether it is necessary for the trial, and whether it is contrary to public
policy.

8

The attitude of Canadian Courts to a request by letters rogatory is
that they should be given effect. In National Telefilm Association v.
United Artists,9 Thompson, J. said:
In any event, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, I think it
must be assumed that the order of a foreign jurisdiction is regular and
in conformity with the Rules and Practice of that jurisdiction. To treat

it otherwise would be to undermine the comity which exists between
nations with respect to the obligations of the laws of one within the
territories of another. It is this comity which I think the pertinent
statutes envisage and not simply the comity of Courts. I therefore apprehend that the American 10order should, wherever possible, be accorded full force and effect.
The traditional prevailing attitude regarding the acceptability of the
purpose for which evidence is sought is reflected in the same judgment as
follows:
From these cases it appears clear that neither in England nor in
this Province, where the governing statutes are similar, will the Court,
in aid of foreign proceedings, order or require a witness whether a
party or not, to submit to examination or production for the purposes
of discovery or pre-trial, but will order such examination and production only for the purposes of affording testimony, oral or documentary
in the nature of proof for the use at trial.11
2
In Re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. and Duquesne Light Co., Robins,
J. said:
The enforcement of letters rogatory is always a matter within the dis-

cretionary power of the Court. Their enforcement is based upon international comity or courtesy proceeding from the law of nations.
Inherent in the idea of international comity is a mutuality of purpose
and of power. As a matter of principle Courts of justice of different
countries are in aid of justice under a mutual obligation consistent with
their own jurisdiction to assist each other in obtaining testimony upon
which the rights of a cause may depend; so generally are individuals
under a duty to give their testimony to Courts of justice in all inquiries

8 See Evans v. Kraay, 35 C.P.C.2d 86 (Sask. 1989); Seminole Electric Co'op v. BBC Brown
Boveri, 35 D.L.R.4th 102 (N.B. 1987); A-Dec Inc. v. Dentech Products, 32 C.P.C.2d 290 (B.C.
1988).
9 14 D.L.R.2d 343 (Ont. High Court 1958).
10 Id. at 346.
11 Id.
12 16 O.R.2d 273 (Ont. High Court 1977).
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where it may be material. Courts in Canada recognize, and have often
said, that, in the interests of comity, judicial assistance should whenever possible be given at the request of Courts of other countries [citations omitted]. It is also fundamental that comity will not be exercised
in violation of the public policy of the state to which the appeal is
made or at the expense of injustice to its citizens; and comity leaves to
the Court whose power is invoked the determination of the
13 legality,
propriety or rightfulness of its exercise [citations omitted].
A more liberal approach has, however, been taken on occasion.
This is illustrated by the view of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding
a letter of request directed only to documents. In United States DisA
4
Courtv. RoyalAm. Shows,' it held that an order for testimony by way of
documentary evidence could be made independently of an order for viva
voce testimony. The Court, however, is not prepared to follow a broader
approach where the sovereignty of Canada may be involved.5
Finally, apart from some of the technical requirements such as that
the requesting body must be a court and not an administrative tribunal
or an embassy, that the request does not constitute a "fishing expedition"
and that it does not violate local laws of civil procedure, it is clear that
the two important general limitations are that:
(1) no witness is required to undergo a broader form of enquiry than
he would if the litigation were being conducted locally; and
could not be secured except by intervention of the
(2) the evidence
16
courts.

If Canada were to accede to the Hague Evidence Convention, it is
unlikely the practical considerations would change substantially since the
object of the Convention is to make available to foreign litigants the same
powers of compulsion as exist for Canadian litigants respecting evidence
sought in Canada. Some reservation permitted by the Convention with
respect to pre-trial discovery might bring the application of the Convention into line with the current practice of Canadian courts.
Letters Rogatory and Discovery
The general approach of the courts using letters rogatory in relation
to discovery is that taken by the Ontario Court of Appeals in Re
Raychem Corp. v. Canusa Coating Systems, Inc.," where Mr. Justice
Brooke, giving the reasons of the Court, stated:
It is the law of this Province that whether one proceeds under the
relevant provisions of the OntarioEvidence Act, R.S.O. 1960, 125, or
the CanadaEvidence Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 307, the Court will order an
13
14
15
16
17

Id. at 290-1.
1 S.C.R. 414 (1982).
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gulf CanadaLtd, 2 S.C.R. 39 (1980).
Jean-Gabriel CASTEL, supra, note 2 at 130.
14 D.L.R.3d 684 (1970).
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examination of 'a witfhess only if it is clear that what is intended is the
taking of that evIdei for the purpose of trial. No such order will be
made if the principal purpose is to use such proceedings to search out
inforation in the same way as an examination for
evidence and
18
discovery.

The judicial attitude toward letters rogatory in relation to discovery
has, however, dtid&gone a minor shift toward a more flexible approach.
While there exists a bias against honoring letters rogatory in pre-trial
proceedings, whpre a strong ease can be made as to the importance of the
evidence and Canida's sovereignty is not thereby infringed, an order may
issue.
The Supreme Court of Canada laid down this rule in R. v. Zingre, 9
which involved a criminal procedure where pretrial testimony required
under Swiss la* had to be taken in Canada. The general approach to be
adopted was outlined by Dickson, J.:
As that great.jurist, U.S. Chief Justice Marshall, observed in The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon & Others, at pp. 136-37, the jurisdiction of a nation within ,its own territory is necessarily exclusive and
absolute, susciptibli of ho limitation not imposed by itself, but common interest impels sovereigns to mutual intercourse and an interchange of good bifices with each other.
It is upoh this comity of nations that international legal assistance
rests. Thus the'cburts of one jurisdiction will give effect to the laws
and judicial decisions of another jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation but out of mutual deference and respect. A foreign request is
given full forceand effect unless it be contrary to the public policy of
the jurisdiction to which the request is directed (see Gulf Oil Corporato the sovtion v. Gulf Canada Limited et al.) or otherwise prejudicial
2°
ereignty or the citizens of the latter jurisdiction.
He then went on t'o give a broad interpretation to section 43 (now
section 46) of the'Canada Evidence Act:
In jeneral, our courts will only order an examination for the purpose of gathering evidence to be used at a trial, but that is not to say
that an order will fiever be made at the pre-trial stage. Section 43 does
not make a distinction between pre-trial and trial proceedings. It
merely speaks of the foteign court or tribunal "desiring" the testimony
of an individbal "hI relatibn to" a matter pending before it. I do not
think it woul'd be wise to lay down an inflexible rule that admits of no
exceptions. The granting of an order for examination, being discretionary, will depend on the facts and particular circumstances of the
individual case. The Court or judge must balance the possible infringement of Canadiafl sovereignty with the natural desire to assist the
courts of justice of a f6reign land. It may well be that, depending on
18 Id. at 689.
19 2 S.C.R. 392 (1981).;
,
20 Id. at 400-401.
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the circumstances, a court would be prepared to order an examination
21
even ff the evidence were to be used for pre-trial proceedings.
The Zingre case must be read against the background of its particular facts. Zingre was charged with fraud and other criminal offenses in
Canada relating to the Churchill Forest Industries development in Manitoba. The accused were not subject to extradition; therefore, Canada requested they be prosecuted in Switzerland. Pursuant to this request, the
Swiss authorities sought to take evidence in Canada through examining
magistrates. In sum, the request was in accordance with Canadian public policy to secure the prosecution of the accused. It is in this light that
the broader view of section 43 must be read.
While Canadian courts are more attuned to discovery as an integral
part of litigation than are European courts, they are generally not prepared to entertain fishing expeditions or the securing of pre-trial evidence, absent a compelling and evident requirement for securing it. The
Zingre case did not shift the equation substantially.
A good illustration is the case of France (Republic) v. DeHavilland
Aircraft of Canada Ltd,22 where the Ontario High Court refused to
honor letters rogatory regarding evidence sought by a French examining
magistrate. The purpose of the request was to secure evidence to determine whether a criminal prosecution in France was statutorily barred by
the law of France regarding the evidence it sought in Canada. In the
Court's view this was a fishing expedition without the exceptional circumstances that applied in Zingre.
State Sovereignty
Another element to be borne in mind in relation to the securing of
evidence is the state sovereignty aspect referred to in Zingre. Canada has
followed the European lead in enacting a so-called "blocking statute"
where evidence is sought in relation to matters likely to infringe on Canadian sovereignty. This legislation is the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C. ch. F-29 (1985). It not only deals with disclosure of
records to foreign tribunals but also with the recognition and enforcement of judgments arising out of proceedings likely to infringe on Canadian sovereignty. This has particular application to antitrust
proceedings.
The genesis of Canada's blocking legislation is found in Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gulf CanadaLtd.2 3 Gulf was based on section 43 (now section
46) of the Canada Evidence Act. In this case, letters rogatory were
sought to be enforced through the Supreme Court of Canada - an unusual but, at that time, not excluded procedure under the Act.
The case concerned a dispute in the United States between Gulf and
21 Id. at 403.

22 40 C.P.C.2d 105 (1989).
23 2 S.C.R. 39 (1980).
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Westinghouse, the latter having agreed to supply uranium fuel to the
reactors it had sold to certain utilities, including Gulf. The world price
for uranium rose and Westinghouse could not perform. It blamed the
price rise on the so-called uranium cartel and, by way of defense to the
proceedings brought against it, brought treble damage antitrust proceedings against Gulf on the basis that it was a member of the uranium cartel.
Gulf, in its defense to the antitrust proceedings, sought to procure
certain Canadian documents, including government directives which its
Canadian subsidiary, Gulf Canada, would have willingly supplied but for
the prohibition to such disclosure contained in the Uranium Information
Security Regulations. Two U.S. courts involved in similar proceedings
issued letters rogatory to compel production of the documents. Gulf
thereupon brought an action against Gulf Canada in the Supreme Court.
The real defendant on the application was the Government of Canada.
The Canadian position, conveniently put in an amicus brief in the
United States proceedings, was as follows.
Canada considered it contrary to her sovereign prerogatives for
foreign tribunals to question the propriety or legality of the actions of
Canadian uranium producers that were taken outside the United States
and were required by Canadian law or taken in implementation of Canadian government policy. Accordingly, when it became clear that
documents located in Canada bearing on the international uranium
marketing arrangement might be removed to the United States in response to proceedings there, the Canadian government promulgated
the Uranium Information Security Regulations, on September 23,
1976. The Canadian government promulgated the Regulations to
serve a vital national interest, particularly the preservation of Canada's
past and future sovereign authority to secure compliance with its own
laws and policies respecting a vital Canadian natural resource in the
face of assertions of jurisdiction by non-Canadian tribunals. These
Regulations were not procured by members of the uranium industry,
not adopted to protect the commercial interests of those
and they were
24
companies.

In refusing the Gulf application, Laskin, C.J.C. said:
I do not see that the Crown, the government, would be entitled to
assert public policy against the enforcement of Canadian law in a Canadian court, but would be so entitled against an attempt to enforce
foreign law in a Canadian court. Public policy is therefore involved in
the application of rules of conflict of laws, as where the enforcement of
foreign law in Canadian litigation may be denied because, for example,
the foreign law may be a penal law or a tax law and therefore within
the categories that are denied enforcement on policy grounds. So too,
where letters rogatory are addressed to a Canadian court, Canadian
government intervention on grounds of public policy may simply re24 Supra note 23 at 55; see also Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse ElectricCorp., 1 All. E.R.
434 (H. of L. 1978).
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flect an objection to extraterritorial
25 enforcement of foreign law in violation of Canadian sovereignty.
In this passage the return of the thread of the extraterritorial application of law in the fabric of cross-border litigation is evident. The new
legislation, enacted after the Gulf case, is a manifestation of the concern
that exists outside the United States on this subject.
Simply stated, the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C. ch.
F-29 (1985), is a potent barrier in some cases to cross-border litigation.
The Act, however, is but a reflection of the view in many jurisdictions
that U.S. litigation, in certain circumstances, particularly at the discovery stage, overreaches in its impact on foreign jurisdictions. This is a
concern that is addressed in Article 12 of the Hague Evidence Convention, which authorizes a refusal to execute letters rogatory where the
state addressed considers that such a request would prejudice its sovereignty or security. In contemplating cross-border litigation, the effect of
blocking provisions in the Competition Act, CAN. STAT. ch. 26, § 54
(1986), may also have to be considered, as well as provincial legislation
which could prevent the disclosure of certain information, such as the
Business Records Protection Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 56 (1980), and
the Business Concerns Records Act, QUE. REv. STAT. ch. D-12 (1977).
IV.

CROSS-BORDER LITIGATION AGAINST GOVERNMENTS AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Proceedingsin Canadaand the State Immunity Act
The discussion of the uranium cartel, the litigation surrounding it,
and the discovery of government documents in the hands of third parties
underlines the large role of the state and its emanations in the international litigation arena. As a final perspective on cross-border litigation, it
might be useful to look briefly at the concept of state immunity.
I do not deal with actions against the Crown in Canada by a foreign
party. That is not, strictly speaking, across the border; however, what is
the position if a party seeks to bring the United States Government into a
Canadian court? That party can be a Canadian resident or can be from a
third state. Such a situation in Canada is governed by the State Immunity
Act, R.S.C. ch. S-18 (1985) which is the Canadian equivalent of the
United States Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act.
The formalities prescribed by the State Immunity Act establish a
number of ways to serve an originating document where the United
States or some other foreign government is sought to be impleaded in a
Canadian court. The most straightforward method is probably to deliver
it personally, or by registered mail, to the Undersecretary of State for
External Affairs, who is charged with transmitting it to the foreign
25

Id. at 62.
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state.26

Service upon an agency of the United States or other foreign sovereign can be done in one of several ways specified in the Act, but failing
agreement by the agency, the most likely manner is in accordance with
any applicable rules of court. The Act provides for such matters as default judgments, setting such judgments aside, execution, and the special
position of military property and central bank property. In sum, careful
attention must be paid to the State Immunity Act when contemplating
an action.
This caution is even more relevant in relation to considering the underpinnings of a claim. In order to proceed effectively, one must bring
oneself within the exceptions to sovereign immunity in § 4 of the Act.
Assuming no waiver of immunity or submission to jurisdiction pursuant
to § 4, the main basis for attack will likely be that the proceedings relate
to commercial activities of the foreign state per § 5.
This qualification to sovereign immunity reverses the leading case
Congo v. Venne, 2 7 where the Supreme Court of Canada refused to adopt
the concept of restrictive sovereign immunity in cases involving commercial activities. That concept applied in the United States for some time
before the Congo decision, albeit as a result of Department of State practice (the Tate letter) rather than of legislation. Congo arose out of a dispute with respect to architectural services provided to the Congo in
connection with its pavillion at Expo '67.
What does this qualification to the application of sovereign immunity under the State Immunity Act mean in practice? Can an ordinary
litigant realistically expect to easily pursue a foreign sovereign state in
the courts of Canada where, arguably, the cause of action arose out of the
commercial activities of that state? One of the most recent examples of
such a case is found in the United Kingdom proceedings taken against
the members of the International Tin Council under analogous
legislation.
InternationalTin Council Litigation
In the tin litigation, various banks and tin brokers were owed considerable amounts (approximately $1 billion) by the International Tin
Council ("ITC"). The ITC incurred this debt due to arbitration awards
for loans and contracts for the purchase and sale of tin. The banks and
tin brokers sought to implead the ITC sovereign state members in the
United Kingdom courts. To do this they had to observe the procedure
prescribed by, and otherwise bring themselves within, the United Kingdom State Immunity Act. This legislation is similar to that in force in
Canada.
The actions proceeded on the basis of a summons on the part of each
26
27

State Immunities Act § 9(2).
[1971] S.C.R. 997.
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state defendant to discharge the order for seryice on them on the basis
that the court had no jurisdiction over them. Ii other words, the member states pleaded their sovereign immunity under the State Immunity
Act and claimed, as well, that they were not liable for he debts of the
body which had been given corporate personality by United Kingdom
law.
These issues became the nub of the several cqss that together went
to the Court of Appeal and subsequently to the -ouqb of Lords under the
name Maclame Watson v. Departmentof Trqde
The essential question
in Maclaine involved the character of the I4ternatirl Tim Council and
the relationship of its members to the Council, Therefore, although the
issue of commercial activity lurked in the background, the points actually litigated concerned only threshold issues.
The general approach of the House of
Lgrcs tg the case was de29
. '-I
scribed in the speech of Lord Templeman:
My Lords, if there existed a rule of international liw which implied in
a treaty or imposed on sovereign states which Qntor intq a treaty an
obligation (in default of a clear disclaimer in' te' fte ty) to discharge
the debts of an international organization ;stablished by that treaty,
the rule of international law could only be enforced finder international law. Treaty rights and obligations 61'pfeed or, imposed by
agreement or by international law cannot be eorcl by te courts of
the United Kingdom .... The courts of the Wnited Kipgdom have no
power to enforce at the behest of any sovereign. state or at the behest of
any individual citizen or any sovereign state rigts grant.ed y treaty or
obligations imposed in respect of a treaty by internafigqal law ....
Public international law cannot alter the meaning and eq t of United
Kingdom legislation. If the suggested rule of public lnternational law
existed and imposed on a state any obligation towards the creditors of
the ITC, then the 1972 order would be in breach of "tnatonal law
because the order failed to confer right§, on credito4 ag~inst member
states. It is impossible to construe the 1972 order as -imposing any
liability on the member states. The coqits of the Udted Kingdom
only have power to enforce rights and obligations Which are made enforceable by the order.
It is obvious from this approach that to attack'a sovereign state
through an alleged breach of an international agreenent involves ensuring, in Canada at least, that there is some c4omestib law on which the
claim can be founded. In the ordinary case,7domqstic law will have to
mesh with or relate to the required commerQial .4ctvity. In other words,
a foundation must be laid for any exception to sovereign immunity which
will, in its absence, come into play as tie basic leun d ei the State Immunity Act.
Thus, the hurdles that have to be cleared in such circumstances are
28 3 All E.R. 523 (1989).
29

Id at 529-530.
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significant. The whole issue of what constitutes commercial activity has
seen much ink spilled. The lesson, of course, is that cross-border litigation against a foreign sovereign ought to be avoided if possible. If not, it
is imperative to bring the action within one of the limited exceptions to
sovereign immunity in the statute, principally commercial activity, and
strictly follow its procedural requirements. The enormous complications
for the plaintiffs in the tin proceedings bear witness to this.
Actions Involving InternationalOrganizations
While I am aware of only one international organization with its
headquarters in Canada at the present time, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the chances of litigation are rather small,
attention to trans-border litigation against international organizations is
merited because of the proliferation of those organizations and the increasing resort to the courts for the solution to problems. The tin litigation flowing from the insolvency of the ITC is also a graphic illustration
of this aspect.
Once again, there is legislation that may be relevant: the Privileges
and Immunities (International Organization) Act, R.S.C. ch. P-23
(1985). One of the provisions of that legislation enables the Governor in
Council to provide that an organization shall have the legal capacities of
a body corporate - the very provision central to the United Kingdom
proceedings involving the International Tin Council.
30
The House of Lords in Maclaine Watson, made very clear the dichotomy in English law between executive recognition of or participation
in international bodies by agreement, and the according of status at domestic law. The rule is that domestic courts generally, according to the
law applied in the United Kingdom (which I submit would be followed
in Canada), will not enforce obligations against or at the behest of an
international organization solely on the basis of a treaty. Recognition in
domestic law is required.
Litigation may, however, be brought by or against an international
organization where it is accorded status as a legal person in the international instrument by which it is constituted and also by the law of a signatory. The rationale is grounded in comity. The courts will recognize
legal persons created by the laws of a foreign state recognized by the
Crown. This was decided by the House of Lords in the recent case of
Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim (Judgment February 21, 1991). Lord
Templeman, in the leading speech in that case, concluded: "The status
of an international organization incorporated by a foreign state is recognized by the courts of the United Kingdom. The status of an international organization incorporated by at least one foreign state should also
be recognized by the courts of the United Kingdom." It had been argued
in Hashim, on the basis of the InternationalTin Councildecision, that no
30 Supra note 27.
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actions would lie because United Kingdom law did not recognize the
Arab Monetary Fund.
The result is that if you ever have to sue or are sued by an international organization in Canada, the first thing to do. is to determine its
status at Canadian law, or at the law of one or more of its members. One
should never assume such proceedings will be easy or quick, and an adequate appreciation of the fundamentals involved is essential.
V.

CONCLUSION

Cross-border litigation covers a very broad spectrum. Perhaps the
most fundamental rule of such litigation is not to assume that the procedural or substantive law in a foreign jurisdiction will necessarily parallel
that with which one is familiar. Careful attention to the limitations that
may exist is essential.
For circumstances in which resort to Canadian courts is required for
the sole purpose of obtaining evidence, the most common situation, it
must not be anticipated that the approach will be as liberal as that followed in United States courts. Proceedings akin to discovery merit a
careful approach. It is that area where one must tread most carefully.
This was recognized by the United States Supreme Court when it
considered the applicability of the Hague Evidence Convention in Aerospatiale v. United States Dist Court,3 1
American courts, in supervising pretrial proceedings, should exercise special vigilance to protect foreign litigants from the danger that
unnecessary, or unduly burdensome, discovery may place them in a
disadvantageous position. Judicial supervision of discovery should always seek to minimize its costs and inconvenience and to prevent improper use of discovery requests. When it is necessary to seek evidence
proceedabroad, however, the District Court must supervise pretrial
2
ings particularly closely to prevent discovery abuses.
The implementation of the Hague Evidence Convention by Canada
through federal and provincial action, while it would advance the matter,
will not change the basic parameters. In this regard I might profitably
close with some remarks made by Robert B. von Mehren in 1984:
In conclusion, one senses from time to time in decisions both by
our courts and foreign courts that there is presently a pervasive judicial
chauvinism which says: "Only our way is right. Our interests, as we
perceive them, are superior to any other national interests." In response, Learned Hand, for whom I clerked years ago, liked to quote
Oliver Cromwell, "I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken." I suggest that the American judiciary
should adopt a Cromwellian hesitation in attempting to apply expansively American style discovery abroad. Similarly, foreign courts
31 107 S.Ct. 2542 (1987).
32 Id. at 2557.
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should not checkmate thoughtful and deliberate applications of the
Hague Convention to resolve international discovery disputes by automatically saying that the discovery is sought for pre-trial purposes and,
thereby, preventing the effective use of the Convention. With give and
a fair and ratake on both great sides of the oceans we can achieve
33
tional accommodation of international interests.

33 16 Int'l Law & Pol. 985 at 996-7 (1984).

